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Abstract
In many emerging economies pension programs of public sector workers are more
generous than pension programs of private sector workers. In this paper we investigate
public pension reforms that improve eﬃciency and welfare by reallocating government
resources from non-productive public pensions to productive public education and in-
frastructure investments. We argue that the opportunity costs of running generous
public pension schemes for civil servants are potentially large in emerging economies
that often suﬀer from low public investments in education and infrastructure. In ad-
dition, we quantitfy the savings distortions as well as the tax distortions from running
a generous public pension program. Calculating transitions to the post-reform steady
state, we ﬁnd that welfare losses for the generation born before the reform are oﬀset
by welfare gains by the generations born after the reform.
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Pension programs for civil servants are on average more generous than pension programs for
private sector workers. This is true for OECD countries as well as for emerging economies
and developing countries. Palacios and Whitehouse (2006) report that OECD countries
spend on average one quarter of total pension payments on public sector retirees, whereas in
developing countries this share is much larger. Pension replacement rates for public sector
workers tend to be considerable larger than the national average (see Table 2 in Palacios
and Whitehouse (2006)). According to a recent OECD report on Brazil, for instance, public
spending on pensions accounts for over 10 percent of GDP, a higher share than in the average
OECD country, despite Brazil’s younger population (OECD (2005)). A large share (almost
one half) goes to public sector retirees (Souza et al. (2004)).
In the presence of population aging the generous public pension policy seems problematic
as it puts a heavy burden on the budget of any economy. This is especially true for emerging
economies where the tax base is smaller and generous pension programs divert much needed
resources away from alternative uses like infrastructure investments or public education.
There is very little justiﬁcation for running two separate pension schemes simultaneously.
The argument that pension programs for civil servants have to be more generous in order to
compensate civil servants for lower public wages only holds partly for emerging economies.
There is evidence that the wage level in the public sector is typically higher than in the
private sector (e.g. Foguel et al. (2000), Panizza (2000), Panizza (2001), and Panizza and
Qiang (2005)). If on top of that public pension programs are more generous than private pen-
sion programs, equity issues will arise, in addition to concerns about economic sustainability
in countries with a high income concentration and the beginnings of population aging. Sur-
prisingly, there have been very few studies written on the reforms of sector speciﬁc pension
programs, such as pension programs for public sector workers, compared to the voluminous
literature on national pension programs.
In this paper we study the adverse eﬀects of generous pension policies for public sector
workers. We identify at least three channels through which generous pensions to civil ser-
vants distort the economy. First, generous pensions crowd out civil servants’ savings and
therefore the accumulation of capital stock. Second, generous public pension schemes are
costly to ﬁnance with taxes that distort the intertemporal consumption and savings decisions
of the households. Third, the forgone opportunities of investing these resources into other
productive government activities can be substantial, especially in developing countries. The
eﬀects from the ﬁrst two channels have been well documented in the literature on social
security (e.g. see Diamond (1965) and Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987)). However, this liter-
ature concentrates on national social security systems. Few papers investigate sector speciﬁc
social security reform assuming that the small number of public sector retirees would only
1allow for small post reform eﬀects. Glomm, Jung and Tran (2006) show that these adverse
eﬀects are substantial but concentrate on early retirement issues. In this paper we therefore
concentrate on exploring the eﬀects of the third channel, alternative investments, while also
taking capital accumulation eﬀects into account. We think that the previous literature has
understated the eﬃciency gains from public policy reform by ignoring the alternative usage
of the freed up resources for investments into infrastructure and public education.
Analyzing the economic eﬀects of generous public sector pensions requires a fully spe-
ciﬁed dynamic general equilibrium model in which recipients of public sector pensions, civil
servants, play a meaningful economic role. We employ one such model in which civil servants
work in two sub-sectors, public education and public provision of infrastructure. This set-up
allows us to not only study the costs of public sector compensation including pension bene-
ﬁts but also the beneﬁts of public sector employment. In addition, the government invests
in a public capital to provide services to ﬁrms. These services are made available free of
charge. We can think of these as being services ﬂowing from the stock of roads and high-
ways. The government also ﬁnances public expenditures on education and social security
payments to private sector workers. In our model ﬁnancing generous public sector pensions
implies opportunity costs of lower expenditures on public education and/or infrastructure.
In order to obtain quantitative results we calibrate the model to Brazil where the public
pension system is unusually generous. In the policy experiments conducted we ﬁrst focus on
steady state outcomes and then compute transitions. Our goal is to investigate alternative
mechanisms to improve eﬃciency and welfare by reallocating government funds from non-
productive public pensions to productive public education and infrastructure investments.
In order to isolate the eﬀects of public pension reform we conduct several policy experiments.
First, we investigate the general equilibriumeﬀects on the intertemporal consumption-savings
decision and then on capital accumulation as a whole while cutting the generosity of public
pension system and letting government consumption adjust to clear government budget
constraints. With this policy experiment we can isolate the pure crowding out eﬀects of
public pension programs on private savings. Then, we let taxes adjust to clear government
budget constraints which allows us to quantify the eﬀects from removing distortions of tax-
ﬁnancing instruments. Finally, we analyze the opportunity costs of generous public pensions
by investing freed up resources into public education and infrastructure while keeping taxes
constant.
We ﬁnd that the direct eﬀects of public pension reform on civil servants’s savings are
relatively small because the public sector agents only make up a small fraction of the labor
force. However, the total savings eﬀects are large. The intuition is that the general equi-
librium interest rates passes the saving eﬀects of the reforms on to private sector agents.
Besides, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of the pension reforms can be much larger, when the pen-
sion reform is used to remove tax distortions from the labor markets. Finally, we ﬁnd that
2using the resources that become available from the reduction in public pensions payments
on public investment in infrastructure or on public education has large eﬀects on output and
welfare. We also conduct sensitivity analysis and ﬁnd that our results are robust to changes
in parameter values.
The adverse eﬀects of public pensions via forgone investment opportunities for other
productive government activities are neglected in the previous literature on social security.
Our key contribution is to highlight that these eﬀects are potentially large. In addition, our
positive analysis could be used as an important justiﬁcation for reforming public pension
systems in developing countries with low levels of public investments.
The following section describes the model and the deﬁnition of the competitive equi-
librium. In section 3 we calibrate the model to Brazil and in section 4 we conduct policy




There is a large number of individuals who live for two periods in an overlapping generation
set-up. Each period accounts for roughly 30 years. For reasons of simplicity we abstract
from population growth and normalize the size of the population to one. A fraction Np of
the population is working in the private sector. The fraction of civil servants is denoted
Ng. Workers who work in the public sector but do not have the status of a civil servant
are counted as private sector workers. Only civil servants have access to generous pension




We distinguish two groups among civil servants. A fraction Nge of civil servants is working in
the public education sector, the others Ngi are working in the “public infrastructure”sector.





gi = (1 − a)N
g.
All civil servants have an identical wage and pension scheme regardless of sector of em-
ployment. This scheme diﬀers from private sector workers in contribution rates and also in
1We present the model solution method and additional ﬁgures in the Technical Appendix of the paper
that is available on the authors’ website at:
http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/Brazil1TecApp.pdf
3beneﬁt payments.
Agents value two diﬀerent types of goods, a privately provided good and a publicly












where σ,β > 0, ct,ct+1 is consumption in period t and t + 1, π is an exogenous survival
probability, β is the time discount factor, and σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution.
The privately supplied good is produced from three inputs, the publicly provided service
Gt, the private capital stock Kt, and eﬀective labor (human capital) in the private sector H
p
t









where αi ∈ (0,1) for i = 1,2,3, α2 + α3 = 1, and A > 0. Capital K depreciates at rate δ
each period. The public good G is provided for free by the government. We think of this
good as roads, highways or other elements of core infrastructure which is made available to
all households and ﬁrms at a zero price. Firms only hire capital and labor. The condition
α2 + α3 = 1 then ensures constant returns to scale in the two hired factors and zero proﬁts.
This kind of production function is standard and has been used by Barro (1990), Glomm
and Ravikumar (1994), Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), Cassou and Lansing (1998) and many
others.













t is public educational human capital (teachers), Et is public education expenditure,
ht is the parental human capital, D > 0, η1 ≤ 1, χ1 > 0, (γ1,γ2) ∈ (0,1), and γ1 + γ2 ≤ 1.
Most models of human capital accumulation such as Loury (1981), Benabou (1996),
Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) or Blankenau and Simpson (2004) only allow for one public
input into human capital production. Here we ﬁnd it useful to disaggregate public education
inputs into teachers H
ge
t and material inputs Et such as textbooks, computers and buildings.
The government uses eﬀective labor (human capital) of civil servants employed in the
non-educational sector Hui
t = HtNui
t = Ht (1 − a)N
g
t and public capital KG
t to produce the












4where Z > 0, χ2 > 0, and η2 ≤ 1. Public capital evolves according to
K
G





Public pensions are indexed to this period’s public sector wages, where w
g
tHt is an indi-





t . Since w
g
tHt is the average wage of an individual agent in a period (which
is roughly 30 years long), the question arises what fraction of this current wage is paid out
to retirees. In order to capture diﬀerent levels of generosity of a pension system we express









where Ψg > 0. The larger Ψg becomes the more generous the public pension system becomes.
In order to calculate the total amount of public pensions paid to retired civil servants we
multiply the individual wage of a current civil servant w
g
tHt by the number of public sector
retirees (the public employees of the previous period) N
g
t−1 and by the generosity factor Ψg.
In period t the government faces the following expenditures (where we will express ex-
penditures for government program i as ﬁxed share ∆i,t of output Yt):
1. public education expenditures
Et = ∆E,tYt, (5)
2. investments in public capital
I
G
t = ∆G,tYt, (6)
3. government consumption
Cg,t = ∆Cg,tYt,








t−1 = ∆Tp,tYt, (7)
















5The government collects two kinds of labor income taxes in the public sector, the stand-
ard tax on labor income τ
g
Lt and an additional social security tax τ
ssg
Lt . Workers in the private




Lt . In addition, capital income is taxed
at rate τKt. The stock of debt that the government can issue in period t is Bt. The govern-
ment collects all accidental bequests from the deceased households. The government budget







































































L,t are payroll taxes for social security, τ
sspf
L,t is the employer (ﬁrm) contribution to social
security in the private sector, τK,t is the capital tax, ∆E,t is the fraction of GDP spent on
public education, ∆G,t is the fraction of GDP spent on increasing the public capital stock,
∆Cg,t is the fraction of GDP consumed by the government, ∆T,t is the fraction of GDP that
goes to retired private sector employees, Ψg is the parameter of generosity of the public
sector pension system, and the last term are accidental bequests that are collected by the
government. We assume that government behavior is exogenous.
2.2 Household Problem




















































where, j = g if it is a public sector worker, j = p if it is a private sector worker, it = kt+1+bt+1
is the agent’s savings in form of physical capital or government bonds, Rt+1 is the gross rate
6of return on investments, and T
j
t+1is a government transfer received when old.2 Household
j takes all tax rates and prices as given. Accidental bequests due to the exogenous survival
probability will be collected by the government.
2.3 Firm Problem
The ﬁrm’s problem is standard. Note, however, that the ﬁrm takes the level of the public
good as given so that the ﬁrm only chooses to hire physical capital and human capital. Note
also that the government collects a social security tax from the ﬁrm at the rate τ
sspf
t . Thus



























2.4 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium


















, a competitive equi-




























t=0 , sequences of aggregate stocks of private physical capital and




t=0 , sequences of aggregate stocks of public physical capital





























t=0 solves the maximization problemof the privately














t=0 solves the maximization problem of the publicly employed
household (9) with j = g;






































qt + 1 − δ,
2The wage of an agent of group j is w
j
tht. We assume that human capital in the public and private sector
is the same, only the fraction employed will diﬀer, so that in the aggregate we will have ht = Ht and the
fraction employed by the private sector is HtN
p
t and the fraction employed by the public sector is HtN
g
t .









t = Kt+1 + Bt+1,
Ht = Ht(1 − N
g
















t + Kt+1 + I
G
t + Et = Yt + (1 − δ)Kt,
(vi) and the government budget constraint (8) holds.
3 Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model to the economy of Brazil which we consider a repres-
entative emerging country with a very generous public pension program. Brazil runs two
separate pension systems for the public and the private sector. There are two constitutional
provisions that guide the implementation of the public sector pension program. The re-
quirement of “Integrality” equates pension payments to the last and highest pay check of
civil servants. The provision of “Parity” indexes pensions to nominal wages paid to all civil
servants.
According to Bonturi (2002) and Souza et al. (2004) the public sector pension system
in Brazil accounts for 50% of all retirement payments, whereas public sector retirees only
account for 5% of all retirees.3 The average contribution rate of civil servants towards their
pension fund is 11%. In the private sector the contribution rates are much higher, roughly
27% (7.6% employees contribution and 20% employer contribution) in the manufacturing
and service sector. In the agricultural (rural) sector contribution rates are somewhat lower
and range around 16%. The average pension paid to private sector retirees amounts to 70%
to 80% of their wage income. Souza et al. (2004) report a deﬁcit of the pension system of
roughly 4.5% of GDP, 3.5% is caused by the public sector, the remaining 1% comes from the
private sector. The generosity of the public sector pension system has led to concerns about
its sustainability.4
3These and the following ﬁgures in this paragraph are based on data from 2001.
4These concerns inspired the original bill of the Constitutional Amendment 40 (Lula Reform 2003) which
had two main objectives. First, it aimed at reducing the huge deﬁcit in the civil sector pension system.
Second, it aimed at making the public system more similar to the private sector system to improve equity.
The changes that were actually approved fell short of the original goals and mainly aﬀect future public
servants. Souza et al. (2004) contains further details of the pension reform in Brazil.
83.1 Preferences and Technology
Table 1 reports preference and technology parameters. The discount factor is a standard
one year estimate but since one period is roughly 30 years long, we scale the discount factor
accordingly.
Note that for the parameters of the consumption goods technology we are imposing
constant returns to scale in the two private factors. Note also that capital’s share of 0.4 is
large relative to the estimates reported in Gollin (2002), but this relatively large parameter
value is consistent with estimates for Brazil in Elias (1992) and with values used by Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
The value for the elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure capital, α1 lies between
estimates by Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Ai and Cassou (1995). For the parameter η2 in the















but we will use other parameter values in our sensitivity analysis that allow for KG and
Hui to be substitutes or complements. We are not aware of any estimates of η2. We set the
parameter χ2, which measures the labor intensity of this technology, equal to unity.
We use a value of γ1 = 0.1 for the learning elasticity with respect to public expenditure.
This is consistent with an estimate by Card and Krueger (1992) and values used by Fernandez
and Rogerson (1996) and by Rangazas (2000). We are also not aware of any estimates of η1.















and perform sensitivity analysis using a variety of values for η1.
Table 2 reports the speciﬁc public policy parameters we use for the calibration exercise.
The top panel in table 2 contains data on government expenditures, the second panel contains
data on tax rates, while the third panel contains data on the relative size of the public and
private labor force.
3.2 Government
We set public expenditures on education exclusive of teacher salaries equal to 1% of GDP.
According to The Economist (Feb. 20, 2003), total public education expenditure in Brazil
in 1999 was 5.1% of GDP. We subtract 25% which is spent on tertiary education, since only
2% of all students attend college, leaving us with 3.825% of GDP. We assume that about
75% of that is spent on salaries of teachers and administrators, leaving about 1% of GDP
for buildings, computers, textbooks, etc.
9According to Calderon, Easterly and Serven (2003), investment in infrastructure is about
1% of GDP. Wages to current civil servants amount to about 5.1% of GDP (Social Security
Ministry of Brazil, 2002). According to the Ministerio de Previdencia e Assistencia Social of
Brazil transfers to the old in the private sector amount to 6.6% of GDP, while public sector
pensions amount to about 5% of GDP (see Souza et al. (2004)).
In our model public sector wages are higher than private sector wages by a factor ξ. We
set ξ = 1.3 to match the size of the public sector wage bill at 4.7% of GDP.
In order to model integrality, we need a measure of wages in the last years of one’s career
relative to wages averaged over the entire career. We set this number Ψg = 1.5 in order to
match the size of the public sector pension bill at 5.6% of GDP. As Ψg > 1 the pensions paid
are actually higher than current average wages.5
Private pension replacement rates are considerably lower than that at Ψp = 0.16. We
again set this replacement rate to match the size of private sector pension bill at 6.98% of
GDP (see Souza et al. (2004)) accounting for the fact that private sector retirees comprise
roughly 94% of all retirees.
Our data on tax rates is from Souza et al. (2004). The social security tax rate levied
from both public sector workers is 11% of wage income. In the private sector employers add
10% of the wage bill to the pension fund.6
The labor income tax rate for both types of employees net of social security contributions
is 11%. The capital tax rate is 15.5% resulting in tax revenue as a fraction of GDP of 35%
excluding social security contribution rates.
According to the Social Security Ministry of Brazil in 2002 there are about 5.2 million
civil servants in Brazil; this constitutes 6% out of a labor force of about 85 million. According
to the Global Education Database, there are approximately 2.17 million teachers in Brazil.
Thus we set a = 42%.
4 Policy Experiments and Results
Our goal is to investigate alternative mechanisms to improve eﬃciency and welfare by realloc-
ating government funds from non-productive public pensions to productive public education
and infrastructure investments. In order to isolate the eﬀects of public pension reform we
conduct several policy experiments. First, we investigate the adverse eﬀects on the inter-
temporal consumption-savings decision and then on capital accumulation as a whole while
5Since wages in the data are rising with age and in the model wages are constant over the entire period,
Ψg and Ψp are actually replacement rates of average wages over the entire period. Since replacement rates
for public pensions are very large in developing countries and actually replacement rates for income earnerd
at higher ages, “average wage” replacement rates of Ψg > 1 shall not surprise the reader.
6Since our model does not account for all government expenditure, our tax rate on employers is lower
than the 20% reported by (Souza et al., 2004, p. 5).
10keeping taxes constant. Then, we study the eﬀects from removing distortions of tax-ﬁnancing
instruments. Finally, we analyze the entire opportunity costs of generous public pensions by
investing freed up resources into public education and infrastructure.
4.1 Public Pensions and Savings
In this policy experiment we report the classic result that public pension programs crowd
out private savings and that pension reforms that remove these distortions improve eﬃciency
and welfare. We call this the “pure savings eﬀect”.
We calibrate our benchmark model to match the Brazilian data. Then, we introduce
an unanticipated pension reform in which we reduce the generosity of public pensions Ψg
and let government consumption ∆Cg adjust to clear the government budget constraint.
Government consumption is unproductive and has no further eﬀects in our model. We keep
the taxation unchanged so that all the distortionary eﬀects from the tax originally ﬁnancing
the public pensions remain in place. We present the results in ﬁgures 1 and 2. We use the
results of this experiment as a benchmark case.
We ﬁnd that cutting the generosity of public pensions increases civil servants’s savings
and capital accumulation. These results are well established in the previous literature on
social security. Our model generates similar results. Surprisingly, even though civil servants
only make up a relatively small fraction of the labor force their savings contribution to capital
accumulation is distorted signiﬁcantly when the government runs a generous public pension
program. Speciﬁcally, if we decrease the generosity of the pension program from Ψg = 1.5
to Ψg = 1 then the steady state output increases by up to 4% of GDP as can be seen in the
top-left panels of ﬁgures 1 and 2 respectively.
The mechanism that drives this eﬀect is described as follows. When the government
cuts the generosity of public pensions, civil servants’ pension incomes when old decrease. In
responding to a lower stream of future incomes, civil servants save more when young in order
to smooth their consumption path. Increases in civil servants’ savings drives down the market
interest rates, which lowers incomes of not only public sector agents but also private sector
agents when old. This results in two opposing eﬀects (income and substitution eﬀect) for the
private sector workers. On the one hand the lower interest rate increases pension transfers
of private sector workers in present value terms, which will reduce savings of private sector
agents. Also, the lower interest rate makes saving less attractive (price eﬀect). Increases
in capital stock from public sector savings increases on the other hand lead to increases
in income of private sector agents, which in turn allows private sector agents to save more
(income eﬀect). All in all the positive savings eﬀects dominate (income eﬀect outweighs the
substitution eﬀect), so that we observe an increase in the capital stock and output. Hence,
the general equilibrium mechanism passes the saving eﬀects on to private sector agents, who
make up more than 90 percent of the population. This policy reform, which ﬁrst has aﬀected
11only a small fraction of population, turns out to be signiﬁcantly larger in the long run when
all the general equilibrium eﬀects are accounted for.
4.2 Public Pensions vs. Taxation
In this policy experiment we investigate the eﬀects from reducing the distortionary eﬀects of
tax-ﬁnancing instruments. In our policy reform we again decrease the generosity of public
pensions Ψg and let taxes adjust to clear the government budget. Since the government
does not have to ﬁnance large public pension program anymore, taxes can be reduced. As a
consequence the labor tax or the capital tax rate can be cut by up to 5 basis points which
ameliorates tax distortions in the economy and improves eﬃciency.
We ﬁrst adjust labor taxes τL and report the results in ﬁgure 1. As the replacement rate
for public pensions Ψg drops from 1.5 to 1, and τL adjusts downwards, output increases by
about 15%. The mechanism that leads to this result can be described as follows. First, there
is a positive savings eﬀect on civil servants due to the reduction of their expected future
pension payments. This eﬀect is captured when letting government consumption ∆Cg adjust
to clear the government budget constraint. We plot this "pure savings eﬀect" as a dotted
line in ﬁgure 1. This eﬀect turns out to explain roughly one third of the output change in
the previous section. Second, since taxes adjust to clear the government budget constraint
there is another eﬀect in play that we call the “tax eﬀect”. As the young are the only savers
in the model, increasing their after tax income increases savings, capital accumulation and
steady state income. This eﬀect is reinforced by a simultaneous drop in the real interest rate,
which lowers debt service and allows a further reduction in the labor income tax rate. This
additional reduction in the tax rate further stimulates capital accumulation and increases
steady state income.
There are two sources of eﬃciency gains resulting from this policy reform: ﬁrst, decreasing
the generosity of public pension reduces the adverse eﬀects on savings, the “pure savings
eﬀect”; and second, lower tax rates decrease tax distortions, the “tax eﬀect”. We ﬁnd that
these two eﬀects together cause the large increase of steady state output of close to 15% of
GDP when the replacement rate is reduced all the way down to Ψg = 1.7
We also let capital taxes adjust in reaction to the cuts in public pensions from Ψg = 1.5 to
1. The results for capital tax adjusting are qualitatively identical but quantitatively smaller.
An adjustment of τK has a smaller eﬀect on output of roughly 4% when Ψg declines from
1.5 to 1. It is interesting to see that when capital taxes adjust there is virtually no output
diﬀerence to the case where capital taxes are unchanged. In our model tax distortions from
7In addition to the steady state equilibrium depicted in ﬁgure 1 there is a second type of steady state
equilibrium in which a decrease of Ψ causes the interest rate R and the labor tax rate τL to rise. An increase
in R is then consistent with lower savings, lower investment and hence higher marginal product of capital
such that the government budget constraint is still satisﬁed. All these together result in a decrease of steady
state output.
12capital taxes only play a minor role, whereas tax distortions from labor taxes have large
eﬀects. The reason is that the channels of eﬀects when capital taxes adjust are diﬀerent.
When letting labor taxes adjust the policy reform increases labor incomes when young and
reduces pension incomes when old. In response, civil servants save more when young in
order to smooth their consumption path, which then drives down the market interest rates.
Increases in income due to lower labor taxes and decreases in the market interest rates induce
agents to accumulate more capital stocks.
When letting capital taxes adjust the pension policy reforms aﬀect not only agent’s
incomes but also the market interest rates directly. As capital tax rates drop the after tax
interest rates increase substantially (see panel 5 of ﬁgure 1). Increases in the net interest rates
induce agents to save less. The eﬀect on capital accumulation is mitigated. This channel of
eﬀects is absent when labor taxes adjust. As a results, eﬃciency gain is substantially smaller.
4.3 Public Pensions vs. Public Education and Investment
In this experiment we identify the eﬀects on eﬃciency and welfare by reallocating govern-
ment funds from non-productive public pensions to productive public uses. That is, we use
the newly available government revenue from making public pensions less generous to ﬁn-
ance increases in public education expenditures and public investment, while keeping taxes
unchanged. The "pure saving eﬀect" is still in play. However, we shut oﬀ the "tax eﬀect" by
keeping all distortive eﬀects of the ﬁnancing instruments unchanged. Besides, we introduce
a new channel of eﬀects, an "opportunity cost eﬀect" of being able to use the released public
funds for more material inputs into education or infrastructure.
We again reduce the replacement rate of public sector pensions Ψg from 1.5 to 1 and use
the extra funds to invest in either public infrastructure or public education. We report the
results in ﬁgure 2. These policy reforms again result in eﬃciency gains. Steady state GDP
increases by 10% when using the extra funds for public infrastructure. The intuition is a
follows. Decreasing Ψg increases savings by public sector workers, which in turn increases
steady state capital and output. In addition, increases in public sector capital make both
private capital and private human capital more productive. If, on the other hand, the
extra funds are used for investments into public education, the results are qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar (see ﬁgure 2). That is, higher investments in public education
increases the steady state level of human capital, hence the rate of return on savings, which
again increases the capital stock and steady state GDP.
In the ﬁrst experiment we show that these eﬀects via savings are relatively small. Now
when we use the extra revenue to fund higher education or infrastructure the total eﬀects
are sizable and more than double the original savings eﬀect. The additional eﬃciency gains
between this and the ﬁrst policy experiment is an estimate of the "opportunity cost eﬀect"
which in our experiment is responsible for an increase of GDP of up to 6%.
134.4 Welfare Analysis
In order to conduct welfare analysis we calculate transitions between the original steady state
with a compensation ratio of Ψg = 1.5 and the new steady state with ratio Ψg = 1. It takes
roughly ﬁfteen periods for the transition to be complete which is a rather long time given
that one period accounts for roughly 30 years. Transitions for all experiments are smooth
and monotone.
We then calculate the compensating consumption levels per age cohort that make agents
indiﬀerent between the benchmark case Ψg = 1.5 and the new regime with Ψg = 1. Figures
3, 4 and 5 report compensating consumption levels for the three policy experiments that we
concentrate on, that is (i) capital taxes adjust, (ii) public capital investments adjust and
(iii) investments into public education adjust.
We ﬁrst record the present value welfare levels of each cohort over the transition period
for the case without a policy change. Second, we record welfare levels for each cohort when
the government administers a change in the pension compensation scheme of civil servants.
We then calculate the average per period compensating consumption for each generation
that equalizes their respective lifetime welfare.
In all three ﬁgures we illustrate the average percentage of current value compensating
consumption over current value consumption for each age cohort. We distinguish between
private (circles), public (triangles) and aggregate (x’s) welfare levels.
For case (i) and (iii) we see that civil servant generations that are born before the policy
change beneﬁt from it because of grandfathering (compare generation 0 in ﬁgures 3 and
4). Private sector workers of generation 0 lose from the reform. There are two eﬀects at
work here. When the policy reform is announced generation zero agents enter their second
(or old age) period. Due to the higher savings of the new public cohorts, the interest rate
drops, so that the savings income of old agents decreases. At the same time wages increase.
Since pensions are indexed to current wages, the pension income of private sector retirees
increases. Since the replacement rate in the private sector is fairly low, the pension increase
is not enough to oﬀset the loss from savings income. Therefore, private sector workers of
generation 0 lose from the pension reform. This happens when capital taxes or public capital
investments adjust as a reaction to the public pension cuts.
All future private sector generations will beneﬁt from the reform. All future public sector
generations will lose from the reform.
The fact that current private sector workers suﬀer welfare losses from the reform has
important implications for implementing such welfare reform. Only when there is a majority
of the currently alive that beneﬁts from the reform, can we expect such reforms to be
implemented. In our case the long run gains from such reforms are not shared with current
generation workers, so that reform success seems unlikely unless current generations can be
compensated with payments that borrow against increased payoﬀs to future generations.
145 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we investigate the magnitude of our results under alternative technology
speciﬁcations.
Human capital production function. The size of the eﬃciency gains of the public
policy reform depends on γ1 the elasticity of human capital (learning) and public education
inputs. In the following we rerun the following policy experiment: reduce the generosity of
public pensions and let investments into public education increase to clear the government
budget constraint. We then repeat this experiment for various values of technology parameter
γ1 ∈ [0.05; 0.15] (benchmark is 0.1) and summarize the results in table 4. As we decrease
the generosity of public pensions from Ψg = 1.5 to Ψg = 1 steady state output increases by
10% in the benchmark case. If parameter γ1 is increased to 0.15 then the output eﬀect is
even larger (15% of GDP) since now the freed up resources are invested in public education
which becomes more and more productive as γ1 increases.
Little is known in the literature on empirical education production functions and about
the elasticity of substitution between teachers and material education inputs, parameter η1.
In table 5 we illustrate how shifting public funds from public sector pensions to education
depends upon η1, the (inverse of the) elasticity of substitution in the education production
function. We see from table 5 that our results are relatively sensitive to changes in η1. In the
benchmark case we set η1 = 0 (Cobb-Douglas case) and found a 10% output eﬀect. This is
an upper limit, since larger values of η1 (CES production function) result in smaller output
changes. If η1 = 1 (linear case), the output eﬀect of an otherwise identical policy reform
decreased from 10% to 4% of GDP.
Final goods and services production function. In table 6 we show how sensitive
the results are with respect to changes in α1, the elasticity of output with respect to public
capital. In this experiment we let investments into infrastructure (public good) adjust to
clear the government budget constraint after the policy reform. We allow α1 to vary from
0.05 to 0.15, (0.1 is the benchmark case according to estimates in Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Ai
and Cassou (1995)). For this range of parameter values reducing Ψg from 1.5 to 1 increases
steady state output between 7% and15%. Thus, for realistic parameter values the eﬀects of
reallocating funds to public investment can be enormous. The larger α1 the more output
increases from additional investments in infrastructure.
Public capital production function.
In table 7 we again compare how shifting public funds from public sector pensions into
public sector capital depends on η2,the elasticity of substitution in the public goods produc-
tion function. Note that if η2 > 0 then public capital and public sector human capital (labor)
are substitutes whereas for η2 < 0 public capital and labor are complements. The eﬀects on
steady state income of using the extra revenue from public sector pensions for investment
15in infrastructure are quite sensitive to changes in η2 and signiﬁcantly larger if public capital
and public sector human capital are complements. As η2 increases (public capital and public
sector human capital become substitutes), the eﬀect on output declines.
Total factor productivity
Given the paucity of estimates of TFP in multi-sector models we decided to use Cobb-
Douglas production functions in our benchmark economy. With Cobb-Douglas production
functions the relative size of total factor productivities (TFPs, A = Z = D = 1) is irrelevant
and has no eﬀect on the quantitative results of our experiments. Only if production functions
producing human capital and the public good are not of the Cobb-Douglas type, do TFPs
aﬀect the experiments quantitatively, but even then our results are robust to changes in
TFPs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have used an overlapping generations model to assess the eﬃciency gains
of re-allocating government funds from unproductive public pensions to productive invest-
ments into public education and infrastructure. We have calibrated the model to Brazil and
provided extensive sensitivity analysis. We found that (i) the direct eﬀects of pension reform
through savings of civil servants are small, (ii) the eﬀects from reducing tax distortions are
large at up to 15% of GDP, and (iii) the indirect eﬀects from reinvesting freed up resources
into public education or infrastructure are also substantial at up to 10% of GDP.
Implementing a policy reform that severely restricts the generosity of public sector pen-
sions is bound to run into strong political opposition since civil servants are typically well
organized. While the long run costs of very generous pensions and the long run gains from
pension reform are clear and well documented in the literature, it is crucial to ﬁnd a way
to overcome short run political opposition. Our model clearly shows that the policy reform
results in substantial welfare losses in the current generation of private sector retirees. These
workers will see a decrease in interest income since the increase in capital accumulation will
lower the interest rate on their savings. These welfare losses will most likely lead to political
opposition and doom any attempts at meaningful reform. Only future generations of private
sector workers stand to gain from the reform as they beneﬁt fully from the higher productiv-
ity level of the post reform economy. We expect such a result to hold in other countries in
Latin America and beyond. This result should also hold if population growth and aging of
the population is taken into consideration.
In this paper we have concentrated on three channels of how public sector pension reform
might inﬂuence capital accumulation. Additional channels might be: (i) The generosity of
public sector pensions inﬂuences workers’ retirement decisions, which in turn has an eﬀect on
GDP. (ii) The generosity of public sector pensions relative to pensions in the private sector
16will inﬂuence how workers will be allocated across both sectors, which in turn will inﬂuence
GDP. This would require the introduction of heterogenous agents who make idiosyncratic
investment choices into their human capital. This extended framework would allow us to
investigate changes in the quality of the public sector labor force, given a speciﬁc worker
compensation package (wages plus pension plan).
In our model the publicly produced service was made available to all ﬁrms and households
at a zero price. While this might be a useful assumption for the provision of infrastructure
like roads and highways, it clearly does not cover all relevant cases. When governments
produce goods like telecommunication services or electricity, they typically charge for these
goods/services. Prices charged need not bear any particular relationship to marginal or
average costs. This will impact the government budget constraint. We leave the exploration
of these channels for future research.
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Elasticity of Substitution σ = 1.5 to match R and K/Y
Discount factor β = 0.9830 to match R and K/Y
π = 0.8 to match share of older population
Technology
Consumption Good:
A = 1 Normalization
α1 = 0.1 Hulten (1996)
α2 = 0.4 Ferreira and do Nascimento (2005)
α3 = 0.6 α2 + α3 = 1
δ = 1
complete depreciation
over 30 year period
Public Good:
Z = 1 Normalization
χ2 = 1 Sensitivity analysis
η2 = 0 Cobb-Douglas




D = 1 Normalization
χ1 = 0.2 Sensitivity analysis
η1 = 0 Cobb-Douglas
γ1 = 0.1 Card and Krueger (1992)
γ2 = 0.5 Sensitivity analysis
Table 1: Preference and Technology Parameters
21Variables for Benchmark Case: Source
Policies:
Investment in public good
(in % of private sector output) ∆G = 2.5%




(in % of private sector output)
∆E = 1% Sensitivity analysis
Government residual expenditure
(in % of private sector output) ∆Cg = 7%
to ﬁx total tax revenue
at 35% of GDP
Immervoll et al. (2006)
Debt level ∆B = 3%
to match debt level of 36% of GDP
reported in Ferreira (2005)
Public wages as a
fraction of private wages ξ = 1.35
Foguel et al. (2000), to
match public wage bill
Indexation parameter
(generosity of private pensions) Ψp = 0.16
Based on Bonturi (2002), to match
private pension bill
Indexation parameter
(generosity of public pensions) Ψg = 1.5 Integrality, to match public pension bill
Taxes:
Labor tax rate




L = 15.4% Ferreira and do Nascimento (2005)
capital tax rate,with bonds τK = 15.5% Immervoll et al.(2006)
social security contribution rate
of civil servants τ
ssg
L = 11%
Immervoll et al. (2006)
and authors’ own calculation
social security contribution rate of
private sector employees τ
ssp
L = 11%
Immervoll et al. (2006)
and authors’ own calculation
social security contribution rate of
private sector employers τ
sspf
L = 10%
Immervoll et al. (2006)
and authors’ own calculation
Labor:
fraction of civil servants Ng = 6% Social Security Ministry of Brazil (2002)
private sector employees Np = 94%
fraction of teachers in public sector a = 42%
Table 2: Government Policy Parameters
22Variables for Benchmark Model Data Source
Capital output ratio K
Y = 2.9 2.6
Bresser-Pereira (1990) and
Souza-Sobrinho (2004)




K = 40% 44.6%
Aschauer (1998) reports
44.6% for the U.S.
Government Size:
Tax revenue
(in % of private sector output) 35.3% 35%
Immervoll et al. (2006)
report 35% of GDP.
Expenditures:
Wage bill public sector workers
(in % of private sector output)
ξwHNg
Y = 4.7% 5.1%
Social Security Ministry of Brazil (2002)
and authors’ calculation
Public pensions
(in % of private sector output)
ΨgξwHNg
Y = 5.6% 5%
Souza et al. (2004)
report 5% of GDP.
Private pensions
(in % of private sector output)
ΨpwHNp
Y = 6.98% 6.6%
Souza et al. (2004)
report 6.6% of GDP.
Table 3: Model Outcomes that Match Brazilian Data
Ψ 1 1.25 1.5 1.6
0.050 106.531 103.601 100.000 97.876
0.060 107.201 104.019 100.000 97.555
0.070 107.909 104.458 100.000 97.219
0.080 108.658 104.922 100.000 96.867
0.090 109.449 105.410 100.000 96.500
γ1 0.100 110.288 105.927 100.000 96.114
0.110 111.180 106.474 100.000 95.710
0.120 112.127 107.054 100.000 95.286
0.130 113.137 107.670 100.000 94.840
0.140 114.214 108.326 100.000 94.370
0.150 115.368 109.025 100.000 93.874
Table 4: Change in Output with ∆E adjusting (η2 = 0.5)
Ψ 1 1.25 1.5 1.6
0.000 110.289 105.926 100.000 96.114
0.250 107.178 103.889 100.000 97.910
η1 0.500 105.462 102.809 100.000 98.731
0.750 104.570 102.278 100.000 99.073
1.000 104.114 102.023 100.000 99.209
Table 5: Change in Output with ∆E adjusting
23Ψ 1 1.25 1.5 1.6
0.050 106.837 103.612 100.000 98.345
0.060 107.563 104.018 100.000 98.138
0.070 108.309 104.434 100.000 97.928
0.080 109.072 104.860 100.000 97.714
0.090 109.857 105.296 100.000 97.496
α1 0.100 110.664 105.743 100.000 97.275
0.110 111.493 106.201 100.000 97.049
0.120 112.345 106.669 100.000 96.820
0.130 113.221 107.150 100.000 96.586
0.140 114.123 107.642 100.000 96.349
0.150 115.050 108.147 100.000 96.107
Table 6: Change in Output with ∆G adjusting (η2 = 0.5)
Ψ 1 1.25 1.5 1.6
-1.000 118.052 109.930 100.000 95.148
-0.750 116.920 109.336 100.000 95.394
-0.500 115.333 108.456 100.000 95.812
η2 -0.250 113.350 107.312 100.000 96.417
0.000 110.664 105.744 100.000 97.274
0.250 109.136 104.815 100.000 97.822
0.500 107.429 103.812 100.000 98.373
Table 7: Change in Output with ∆G adjusting
24.











































































Figure 1: Eﬀect of decreasing public sector pensions Ψg and decreasing labor taxes τL or
capital taxes τK













































































Figure 2: Eﬀect of decreasing public sector pensions Ψg and increasing public investment
∆G or public education ∆E
















































































Figure 3: Compensating consumption given to individuals to oﬀset the policy change that
reduces the generosity of public pension replacement rate Ψg = 1.5 to Ψg = 1.0 letting capital
tax τK adjust to clear the government budget constraint. Compensating consumption is
expressed as the average percentage of current value per period compensating consumption
over current value consumption.

















































































Figure 4: Compensating consumption given to individuals to oﬀset the policy change that
reduces the generosity of public pension replacement rate Ψg = 1.5 to Ψg = 1.0 letting
investments into public capital ∆G adjust to clear the government budget constraint. Com-
pensating consumption is expressed as the average percentage of current value per period
compensating consumption over current value consumption.

















































































Figure 5: Compensating consumption given to individuals to oﬀset the policy change that
reduces the generosity of public pension replacement rate Ψg = 1.5 to Ψg = 1.0 letting public
education expenditures ∆E adjust to clear the government budget constraint. Compensating
consumption is expressed as the average percentage of current value per period compensating
consumption over current value consumption.
28